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Forthcoming, Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics (2010) 
 
Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A 
Critique of Some Academic Perspectives 
 
WILLIAM H. SIMON* 
 
Much recent academic discussion exaggerates the distance between 
plausible legal ethics and ordinary morality.  This essay criticizes three 
prominent strands of discussion: one drawing on the moral philosophy of 
personal virtue, one drawing on legal philosophy, and a third drawing on 
utilitarianism of the law-and-economics variety. The essay uses as a 
central reference point the “Mistake-of-Law” scenario in which a lawyer 
must decide whether to rescue an opposing party from the unjust 
consequences of his own lawyer’s error.  I argue that academic efforts to 
shore up the professional inclination against rescue are not plausible.  I 
conclude by recommending an older jurisprudential tradition in which 
legal ethics is more convergent with ordinary morality. 
  
Both critics and defenders of the legal profession often assume that a 
vast gulf separates ordinary morality and lawyers’ ethics.  Disparaging 
“lawyer jokes” often turn on an implied distance between lay and lawyer 
morality.1 Although they take a different view of the substance of lawyer’s 
ethics, prominent lawyer expositors of professional responsibility also 
assume that its distance from ordinary morality is necessarily large.  A 
classic article by Stephen Pepper defends “the lawyer’s amoral ethical 
role.”  In a recent book, Daniel Markovits defends a “modern legal ethics” 
that pervasively requires lawyers to “lie” and “cheat.”  The lawyer in such 
expositions appears as a moral freak, albeit a benign one. 
The divergence idea is largely associated with lawyer devotion to 
clients at the cost of injustice or harm to third parties and the public.  In 
this essay, I criticize academic versions of the three types of argument 
most often made to minimize the lawyer’s responsibilities to nonclient 
interests.  The first defense draws on the moral philosophy of personal 
                                                 
* Everett B. Birch Professor of Professional Responsibility, Columbia University.  I 
am grateful for advice and encouragement to Barbara Fried, Kent Greenawalt, Dan Ho, 
Katherine Kruse, John Leubsdorf, Daniel Markovits, Steve Pepper, Deborah Rhode, John 
Steele, Brad Wendel, and Ben Zipursky.  Markovits and Pepper were especially 
generous. 
1. See MARC GALANTER, LOWERING THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL 
CULTURE 161 (2005) (“An ancient, nearly blind old woman retained the local lawyer to 
draft her last will and testament, for which he charged her two hundred dollars.  As she 
rose to leave, she took the money out of her purse and handed it over, enclosing a third 
hundred-dollar bill by mistake.  Immediately the lawyer realized that he was faced with a 
crushing ethical question: Should he tell his partner?”). 
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virtue; the second on jurisprudence, and the third on utilitarianism of the 
law-and-economics variety (though my examples come more from casual 
conversations than from the publications of any particular theorist). 
I suggest that each of these accounts is unsatisfactory as a matter of 
both morality and law.  Their common defect is to exaggerate the 
necessary distance between ordinary morality and legal ethics.  This defect 
could be viewed as unfair to lawyers in painting their role as less morally 
attractive than it need be or as overly generous to them in offering an 
undeserved measure of immunity from lay moral criticism. 
I begin with a hypothetical to orient the contrast between ordinary 
morality and the three defenses of aggressive role morality; then take up 
the three defenses in turn; and conclude by pointing toward an alternative 
theoretical tradition that is more plausible jurisprudentially and more 
attractive ethically. 
 
I. THE MISTAKE-OF-LAW PROBLEM 
  
Lawyer X represents the defendant, a large corporation, in a personal 
injury case arising from an accident in which a truck driven by one of its 
agents injured a pedestrian -- the plaintiff.  In the course of extensive 
negotiation, X realizes that the plaintiff’s lawyer is operating under a 
mistaken assumption about the applicable law.  The plaintiff’s lawyer 
thinks that if X proves that his client was contributorily negligent, it will 
bar the plaintiff's claim entirely.  There is high probability that X can 
establish contributory negligence.  However, a recent statute in the 
relevant jurisdiction replaces contributory with comparative negligence.  
Plaintiff's counsel is aware of the statute but mistakenly thinks that it does 
not apply to this case because the relevant events occurred before its 
enactment.  In fact, the statute applies to all cases filed after its enactment, 
which would include this case.   
Plaintiff's counsel has made an offer to settle the case on terms that X 
believes are more favorable to his client than a fully informed lawyer 
would recommend to the plaintiff.  That is, the offer is outside the zone of 
minimally probable trial outcomes (appropriately adjusted for likelihood 
and litigation expense) on the side that favors the defendant.  X is highly 
experienced and is confident of this judgment. 
Should X accept the offer without informing opposing counsel about 
his mistake?  Assume that, if X put the issue to the client, the client would 
decide not to disclose. 
Assume further that neither disclosure nor failure to disclose would 
subject X to discipline or liability.  On the other hand, X wants to decide 
what to do in a principled way so that he could justify his decision.2 
                                                 
2. This is a slightly modified version of a problem that appears in GARY BELLOW & 
BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL INSTRUCTION IN 
ADVOCACY 586-91 (1978).  In 1977, I saw Gary Bellow teach it to a class of about 50 at 
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The assumption that doctrine does not explicitly dictate either 
disclosure or nondisclosure seems basically realistic, but we should take 
note of two rules by way of background.   
First, the bar’s confidentiality rule in its most widely adopted form 
forbids disclosure without client consent of “all information relating to the 
representation” with certain specified exceptions not relevant here.3 
Although this definition of protected information literally includes 
information about legal authority, it is invariably interpreted to exclude it.4   
No one doubts, for example, that X would be free to advise someone in an 
unrelated matter about the comparative negligence statute without this 
client’s permission, which would not be the case with information covered 
by the confidentiality rule.  
Second, the disciplinary rules require that the lawyer disclose “to the 
tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer 
to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by 
opposing counsel.”5  Under some circumstances, this rule might oblige the 
lawyer to disclose the retroactivity provision in the comparative 
negligence statute to the court.  However, the rule does not apply to out-
of-court dealings with counsel.6 
Of course, a variety of professional responsibility rules invoke general 
standards -- such as competence, loyalty, and client control -- that might 
be interpreted to entail nondisclosure.  Other rules that prohibit 
“dishonesty” and “conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” 
                                                                                                                         
Harvard Law School.  The class divided evenly over whether the lawyer should disclose.  
In 2007, I taught the problem to a class of about 50 at Harvard Law School.  Only one 
student favored disclosure.  In classes at Stanford and Columbia over the past 10 years, 
disclosure has usually drawn a substantial minority, but never close to half.   
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. 
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 cmt. e 
(2009). The New York rule explicitly excludes information about legal authority from the 
duty of confidentiality.  N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2009).   
5. MODEL RULES R. 3.3(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
6. Some contract doctrine makes a contract voidable where one party knowingly 
fails to correct the other’s mistake about a “basic assumption” and nondisclosure amounts 
to a breach of “good faith” and “reasonable standards of fair dealing.”  RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §161(b) (1981).The comments do little to resolve the 
ambiguity as to how the provision applies in the Mistake-of-Law scenario.  Compare id. 
§161 cmt. d, illus. 6 (failure to correct mistake about validity of operating license for 
facility qualifies), with id. §161 cmt. d, illus. 10 (1981) (failure to correct mistake about 
mineral deposits disclosed in government surveys does not qualify).  By employing 
undefined and open-ended terms, the provision requires us to look to other bodies of 
authority to decide when information is “basic” and conduct not “reasonable’ and not in 
“good faith”.  For our purposes, it is most plausible to see this doctrine, not as creating or 
precluding an independent duty of disclosure in the Mistake-of-Law case, but as making 
the remedy of voiding the settlement available to the extent that other authority creates 
such a duty.  Thus, I proceed in the rest of the article to consider what other authority 
there might be.  
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might be interpreted to require disclosure.  But any such interpretation 
would depend on some background understanding about law or the 
lawyer’s role.  The rest of this essay will explore the available background 
understandings. 
As a matter or ordinary morality, the case for disclosure is simple and 
obvious: The lawyer should disclose because only disclosure will prevent 
serious harm to the plaintiff, and the lawyer can disclose without 
significant cost to himself or to the legitimate interests of anyone else.  
The argument supposes two sorts of harm to the plaintiff in the absence of 
disclosure.  From a substantive perspective, harm arises from the denial to 
the plaintiff of a benefit to which the statute entitles him.  Procedurally, 
harm arises from the unfairness of a process in which the dispute is 
resolved without the decisionmakers knowing relevant law. 
Note that this “ordinary morality” view of the matter is not 
independent of law.  Law figures in ordinary morality.  To the extent 
ordinary morality differs from the legal profession’s ethical precepts, the 
difference turns on the greater priority ordinary morality gives to direct 
vindication of substantive legality and procedural fairness over client 
loyalty.   
We are dealing here with two views of the relative roles of ordinary 
morality and differentiated professional morality in lawyering.  One, 
which seems to be dominant among nonlawyers, prescribes a relatively 
small divergence from ordinary morality in legal ethics.  The other view, 
which seems dominant among law students and lawyers, prescribes a 
relatively large divergence. We can get a sense of the nature of the 
divergence by turning to the arguments for nondisclosure in the Mistake-
of-Law case. 
   
II. CONVENTION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 
 
Many law students and lawyers have a visceral reaction against 
disclosure before they can give a reason for it.  They seem to feel that non-
disclosure is virtually constitutive of the lawyering role.  They recognize 
that most lay people are likely to favor disclosure, but they feel that they 
gave up the perspective that underlies the lay view when they decided to 
become lawyers, and they experience arguments for disclosure as attacks 
on their chosen professional role.  It is important to acknowledge that 
there are reasonable arguments against disclosure, but it is equally 
important to recognize that many of the arguments for disclosure are 
internal to the lawyer’s role.  They are not arguments about whether a 
good person can be a good lawyer; they are arguments about what it takes 
to be a good lawyer.   
A first unreflective reaction to the problem is, “It’s not the lawyer’s 
job to help out the other side.”  Or as Justice Jackson put it, lawyers 
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should not depend on “wits borrowed from the adversary.”7 But this is 
clearly wrong.  Much of what the lawyer does is designed to help the other 
side, and lawyers are necessarily dependent on the judgment and efforts of 
their adversaries.  Drafting pleadings, producing material in discovery, 
giving notice of witnesses, restricting argument to matters of record, and 
refraining from misrepresentation are core practices of lawyering, and they 
all help the other side.  It is true that lawyers are inclined to help the other 
side in ways that do not benefit their own clients only insofar as they are 
obliged to, but the question posed by the Mistake-of-Law Problem is 
precisely whether the lawyer is obliged to offer a certain kind of help. 
The most likely second reaction is that nondisclosure is required by 
the “adversary system.”  This seems to be an argument from convention.  
A convention is a practice that is habitually performed and accepted 
without controversy.  The proponent of a convention sometimes benefits 
from a presumption in favor of its goodness and is thus excused from 
offering more direct and specific arguments for it. 
However, there is no specific conventional response to the Mistake-
of-Law problem.  The problem rarely arises, and we have virtually no 
direct evidence about how lawyers respond when it does.  Moreover, when 
lawyers and law students are presented with the hypothetical, it appears to 
be controversial.  In my experience, a majority favors nondisclosure, but a 
significant minority disagrees.   
The argument from convention appears to be that nondisclosure is 
entailed by other values and practices that constitute the “adversary 
system.”  Those who appeal to this conventional view to support non-
disclosure think that, if the particular practice of nondisclosure is 
controversial, that is only because those who resist it fail to recognize the 
implications of other values and practices to which they habitually 
acknowledge commitment. 
In fact, there is no conventional definition of the adversary system that 
entails any answer to the Mistake-of-Law problem or indeed most of the 
disputed issues of the ethics of advocacy.  Any definition of the adversary 
system that entailed responses to these problems would be just as 
controversial as those problems are in isolation.     
The best conventional definition of the adversary system – the one 
that most aptly expresses longstanding and widely accepted views – is the 
comparatist’s.  It contrasts our adversary system with the most salient 
example of a non-adversary legal system – the civil law systems of 
continental Europe.  This definition looks to the relative allocation of 
authority between judges on the one hand and advocates on the other with 
respect to the raising of issues, the use of evidence, and the conduct of 
trials.8  In an adversary system, parties and their lawyers have pre-eminent 
                                                 
7. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947). 
8. See, e.g., MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY 
(1991). 
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control and responsibility for deciding what issues to raise and what 
evidence to seek and introduce, and they have a relatively independent 
role in the conduct of the trial, in particular, the examination of witnesses.  
By contrast, in the civil law system judges have more initiative and control 
over such matters. 
The comparatist’s definition does not seem to be what people have in 
mind when they assert that the adversary system resolves the Mistake-of-
Law Problem.  The comparatist’s definition focuses, not on the 
responsibilities of the lawyers and parties to each other, but the relation of 
the judge to the lawyers.  The greater autonomy of counsel in this system 
might just as readily be interpreted to imply greater responsibility for the 
ultimate fairness of the proceedings, since the adversary system judge has 
less capacity to control them.  Yet, this greater autonomy of counsel seems 
to be the only sense in which it is uncontroversial to say that we have an 
adversary system.   
As far as conventional understanding is concerned, a system that 
required disclosure in the Mistake-of-Law scenario could be just as much 
an “adversary system” as one that required the opposite.  George 
Sharswood, one of the most eminent legal ethicists of the 19th century 
asserted in his treatise that “[c]ounsel … are duty bound, to refuse to be 
concerned for a plaintiff in the pursuit of a demand, which offends his 
sense of what is just and right.”9  This precept became marginalized within 
the profession by the end of the century, but neither the lawyers who 
espoused it nor the ones who rejected it doubted the validity of the 
“adversary system.”  Prior to the 1930s, there was very little opportunity 
for a litigant to force an opposing party to disclose information and 
evidence in advance of trial.  Lawyers resisted the reforms that have made 
virtually all relevant information and evidence discoverable on the ground 
that such a practice was incompatible with the adversary system.  
However, they lost, and broad discovery has become an accepted part of 
what no one doubts is still an “adversary system.” 
It is perhaps surprising that, among academics, philosophers have 
been especially susceptible to the mistake of conflating particular 
elaborations of the adversary system with its core principles.  Moral 
philosophers appear occupationally prone to take an interest in “role 
morality.”  Some appear to find the same excitement in discovering role-
based norms that defy ordinary morality that astronomers take in 
discovering a planet whose movement deviates from the laws of physics.  
Advocacy norms that license deception or opportunism fit the bill exactly.   
Of course, moral philosophers are less likely than lawyers to presume 
the value of a convention.  But they are happy to appeal to convention to 
define their subject.  In a common approach, the philosopher starts by 
noting that one or more problematical lawyer norms are integral to the 
                                                 
9.  GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 39 (2d ed. 1860). 
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“adversary system.”  She then proceeds to consider whether the 
“adversary system” can be justified as a social institution, and/or whether, 
assuming it is justified, acting as a lawyer in accordance with its 
specialized norms is consistent with some conception of personal virtue.10 
This tendency recurs in Daniel Markovits’s recent A Modern Legal 
Ethics.11  The book is a palace of fancy theory built as a garage for a 
jalopy.  The jalopy is the conception of “adversary advocacy” elaborated 
in the American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 
On the basis of this document and some interpretive case law, Markovits 
concludes that “adversary advocacy” requires lawyers to “lie” (deceive in 
various ways) and “cheat” (take advantage of rules in ways not intended 
by their drafters).12   
He then defends adversary advocacy as a way of engendering a sense 
of “democratic legitimacy” by mediating between the law and the client’s 
self-understanding. Through formulating the client’s view in terms of 
public norms, the lawyer makes it possible for disputants to engage each 
other and the judge in a common language.  At the same time, by virtue of 
her own deep engagement with the client’s point of view, the lawyer gives 
the client a sense of participation in the process that leads to acceptance or 
ownership even when the client loses.13 This effect requires that the client 
perceive the advocate as a partisan presumptively committed to her 
interests, rather than someone responsible for judging her interests. This 
argument is interesting, but it does not say anything about any 
controversial issue of legal ethics. As Markovits recognizes, any 
conception of adversary advocacy has to acknowledge some limits on 
client loyalty, and his political legitimacy argument provides no principled 
basis for locating those limits. 
Yet Markovits speaks of all the injunctions to “lie” and “cheat” in the 
current version of the Model Rules as “engender[ed]” by “the principles of 
lawyer loyalty and client control that … establish the center of adversary 
                                                 
10.  See Alan Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE 
GOOD LAWYER 123-149 (David Luban ed., 1983); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: 
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1985); David 
Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83-122, and Arthur Isak 
Applbaum, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND 
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 104-09 (1999).  Donagan and Fried defend professional morality 
against ordinary morality; Luban and Applbaum do the opposite.  All of them presuppose 
a degree of divergence between professional and ordinary norms that I do not think is 
defensible even within professional morality. 
Bernard Williams seems to have anticipated the key problem when he suggested that 
philosophers should “ask how in detail the justifying arguments for the profession as a 
whole apply to this or that practice.” Bernard Williams, Professional Morality and Its 
Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra, at 266 (emphasis added). 
11. DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A 
DEMOCRATIC AGE (2008).  
12. Id. at 45-64.  
13. Id. at 171-211. 
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advocacy.”14 He applies such terms to two very different sorts of practices 
without distinguishing them. One is the advocate’s duty to make any 
effective non-frivolous argument to a court for a client’s position 
regardless of whether she is personally convinced of its merit.15 This norm 
is not controversial within the profession.  It represents a minimal 
departure from ordinary morality.  It is grounded in the belief that, by 
deferring private judgment, the advocate facilitates a more reliable and 
accountable resolution by the judge.   
However, Markovits also uses his conception of adversary advocacy 
to support a range of practices that are controversial and cannot reasonably 
be seen as facilitating more reliable and accountable decision-making, 
such as impeaching a witness that the lawyer knows (on the basis of 
reliable private information) is telling the truth.  And Markovits 
understands the bar’s norms to demand nondisclosure in cases like the 
Mistake-of-Law problem.16 
On the other hand, where he reads the Model Rules to restrain 
aggression, Markovits approves the restraints on the grounds that the 
practices in question would “subvert,” “undermine,” or “misuse” the 
adversary process.17 He never considers how remarkable it is that a trade 
association, struggling with internal division and external pressure, should 
come up with a code that converges so seamlessly with the immanent 
logic of its governing concept.  Apparently, the owl of Minerva spreads 
her wings whenever the House of Delegates votes.     
Markovits does not explain why his general account of the virtues of 
adversary advocacy requires any particular norm of the Model Rules.  
Why, for example, do the Model Rules (or the ideal of “adversary 
advocacy” that they incarnate) mandate disclosure to the court of 
                                                 
14. Id., at 88. 
15. Id. at 53. 
16. I so conclude from Markovits’s approving description of an opinion by an ABA 
ethics committee asserting that a lawyer is free to file a claim barred by the statute of 
limitations in the hope that the opposing lawyer will not be aware of the defense and that 
the filing lawyer is forbidden by confidentiality to disclose that the claim is time-barred 
without the client’s consent.  See MARKOVITS, supra note 9 at 56, 275 n. 84 (quoting 
ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-387 (1994).  But the 
Committee’s conclusion with respect to non-disclosure is not supported by argument or 
citations to authority, and both conclusions are disputed in a vigorous dissent.   
 For further indications that the Committee’s view on nondisclosure is 
controversial, see Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 571 F. Supp. 
507, 512 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (stating that plaintiff’s lawyer had a duty to reveal to the 
defendant that his client had died before concluding a settlement: “[C]andor and honesty 
necessarily require the disclosure of such a significant fact . . . .”); Leardi v. Brown, 474 
N.E.2d 1094, 1099 (Mass. 1985) (holding that the inclusion of an unenforceable term 
purporting to negate a tenant right in a residential lease – presumably in the hope that the 
tenant would not learn of its unenforceability – violates a statutory prohibition against 
unfair and deceptive practices). 
17. MARKOVITS, supra note 9, at 57-58. 
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controlling legal authority unknown to opposing counsel and not mandate 
disclosure of controlling authority to opposing counsel when the case is 
settled out-of-court?  (The effects of nondisclosure would seem to be the 
same in both situations.)  Why does the Code prohibit the knowing offer 
of perjury but (according to Markovits) mandate that the lawyer engage in 
cross-examination intended to induce the jury to draw what the lawyer 
knows is a false inference?  (Both practices increase the risk of a wrong 
result, and prohibiting either requires the lawyer to make a private 
judgment about truth or falsity.)  Why is the Model Rule that prohibits 
disclosure of a client’s fraudulent plans unless the lawyer has been 
involved in them better than, say, New York’s rule, which permits 
disclosure regardless of the lawyer’s involvement, or New Jersey’s which 
mandates disclosure?  No doubt there are arguments for each of these 
choices.  I doubt, however, that any of them can be derived from the 
abstract idea of an adversary system, even as Markovits elaborates it, or 
that a system adopting the norms imposing more third-party responsibility 
would be any less an “adversary system” than the one conjured by the 
ABA. 
After provocatively insisting on the gulf between ordinary and lawyer 
morality, Markovits gestures toward the possibility of reconciliation by 
suggesting that, while lay people may frown on adversary advocacy as 
detached observers, they find it satisfying as disputants.  He supports this 
argument with references to social science literature that suggests that 
claimants often attach great importance to procedural fairness in 
appraising their treatment by public officials.18   
However, nothing in this literature indicates that the respondents 
associate cross-examining a truthful witness or arguing false inferences or 
any other form of “lying” or “cheating” with fair procedure or with any 
kind of legitimacy.  Tom Tyler, whose work Markovits relies on, found 
that people seeking public assistance for such matters as disturbances of 
the peace or housing code violations valued respectful responses from 
officials even when they did not get what they wanted.  But in the cases he 
studied, the people who were disappointed had no reason to think they 
were being treated unfairly in any sense.  Far from finding a divergence 
between substantive and procedural justice, Tyler concluded, “Procedural 
issues are not independent of questions of outcome.  Fair outcomes are on 
thing that people expect from a fair procedure.”19 
Moreover, we should be wary of indulging appeals to any ideal of 
procedural justice that compromises substantive legality.  Outside the 
sphere of lawyering, we take as a defining feature of both justice and 
legitimacy “Congruence Between Official Action and Declared Rule.” 
Lon Fuller, who saw such congruence as a basic condition of the integrity 
                                                 
18. Id. at 188-193.  
19. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 164 (1990).  
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of a legal system, insisted that “most forms of ‘procedural justice’” are 
“designed to maintain” it. 20 
Part of the problem may be a matter of perspective.  Lawyers 
discussing fairness in the judicial process typically invoke the perspective 
of litigants, and social scientists are interested in the potential of courts to 
induce disputants to accept their resolutions.  But few lay people spend 
much of their lives in litigation.  When they think of the rule of law, they 
are apt to think less of how they will be treated if they should end up in 
court and more about whether their rights will be respected as they go 
about their lives in civil society.  Here the key value is likely to be 
“congruence” – the expectation that the laws that purport to govern their 
situation will be applied in some foreseeable and substantively fair 
manner.21   
  
III. AUTONOMY WITHIN THE “BOUNDS OF THE LAW” 
 
Probably the most common rationale for nondisclosure in the 
“Mistake of Law” problem emphasizes that no law requires disclosure and 
argues that, in the absence of such a law, the lawyer owes it to the client 
not to do anything that would interfere with the client’s goals.  Most 
lawyers instinctively leap to this position, and many are content to remain 
there.   
Stephen Pepper has given the best known jurisprudential account of 
this position in The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role.22  His argument begins 
with the claim that law is, fundamentally and paradoxically, about 
autonomy.  It protects autonomy by limiting it so that everyone can have 
an equal share of it.  The only legitimate public constraint on an 
                                                 
20. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 81 (1964).  
21. This is not the place for a full critique of Markovits’s book.  Such a critique 
would have to deal with Markovits’s argument that the value of advocacy lies in 
facilitating authentic self-assertion by the client and his invocation of the poet John 
Keat’s idea of “negative capability”.  MARKOVITS, supra note 9, at 93-98.  Markovits 
argues that the advocate resembles the Keatsian poet in creating conditions that invite the 
audience to imaginatively identify with his subject/client in the subject/client’s concrete 
individuality.  This idea bears little relation to advocacy as it usually practiced, which 
aims, not at authenticity, but rather at fashioning the client and his claims in terms that 
respect and flatter the values of the judge and jury.  As a matter of jurisprudence, it seems 
questionable to locate the core value of advocacy in the public expression of the client’s 
identity, rather than in the protection of the client’s rights.   As a matter of literary theory, 
the argument is vulnerable to critiques of the Romantic ideal of personal authenticity.  
See, e.g., RENÉ GIRARD, DECEIT, DESIRE AND THE NOVEL: SELF AND OTHER IN LITERARY 
STRUCTURE (Yvonne Freccero trans., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (rejecting the 
“Romantic lie” that the self the protagonist asserts in public can be authentic and 
embracing the “novelistic truth” that this self is inevitably a function of social 
circumstances).   
22. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A Problem, 
and Some Possibilities, 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 633 (1986). 
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individual’s pursuit of her ends is law.  The lawyer, as an agent of the 
legal system, has a duty to advance the client’s autonomy and cannot 
recognize any limit on that duty other than law.  Any other limit would 
constitute an unjustifiable infringement of the liberty the law is supposed 
to protect. 
David Luban wrote a famous reply to Pepper’s article.23 He argued 
that there are many important public values other than autonomy; that 
some of these values do not take the form of law; and that both social 
order and fairness permit and even require coercive (though not 
necessarily public) enforcement of such nonlegal values.  “It is illegal to 
smuggle a bottle of nonduty-free Scotch into the country.  It is not illegal 
to seduce someone through honey-tongued romancing, maliciously 
intending to break the lover’s heart afterwards,” he wrote.  Even where it 
is be impractical to regulate the latter kind of conduct legally, informal 
social regulation by lawyers as well as lay people is often practical and 
desirable  
Luban’s position is closer to Pepper’s than it appears at first glance.  
An interesting section of Pepper’s article had taken account of “The 
Problem of Legal Realism.”  Legal realism insists that “if you want to 
know the law and nothing else,” which is presumably what Pepper’s 
“amoral” lawyer should want, you should look at it as a “bad man” would 
and attend only to the “material consequences” that the state attaches to 
relevant courses of action.24  The Realist and the bad man care about the 
terms of enacted law only insofar as they help predict the application of 
sanctions.  The “problem” with this perspective for legal ethics is that it 
drains law of authority.  The transition from substantive rules to sanctions 
leads to a further move from the sanctions prescribed on the books to the 
sanctions that are actually likely to be applied, given the inclinations, 
knowledge, and resources of the parties and public officials.  And at this 
point law seems no longer to represent coherent boundaries of liberty so 
much as “what you can’t get away with.”   
For Luban, the “Problem of Legal Realism” means that a plausible 
lawyer ethic has to involve more than fidelity to law and an autonomy 
defined as whatever the law does not effectively prevent.  It has to involve 
at least some measure of nonlegal morality.  Pepper had anticipated this 
view somewhat.  His main solution to the “Problem of Legal Realism” 
was to permit a kind of conscientious objection: where the lawyer had 
moral qualms about a client’s lawful course of action, she could withdraw.  
The main difference between Pepper and Luban seemed to be about 
whether non-legal morality can generate professional duty.  Pepper 
thought that non-legal morality could provide a private excuse for refusing 
                                                 
23. See David Luban, “The Lysistratian Perspective: A Response to Stephen 
Pepper,” 11 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986). 
24. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1897).  
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to aid the client, but not a professional duty.  Luban thought lawyers 
sometimes had a professional duty to vindicate non-legal morality.  Such a 
duty would clearly support public criticism.  He left open whether it could 
support material sanctions.25 
There is, however, another line of criticism of Pepper’s view that 
Luban does not take up.  Pepper’s “amoral ethical role” rests on three 
premises: 
 
 1.  Lawyers owe fidelity to law. 
 
 2.  Law is strongly differentiated from morals. 
 
     3.  Other than her duty to law, the lawyer’s only important duty is 
to the client’s autonomy. 
 
Everyone accepts the first point.  Luban attacks the third.  But the 
second point is at least as vulnerable. 
The principle that law is strongly differentiated from morals is 
associated with the doctrine of Legal Positivism. Legal Positivism 
sometimes purports to offer only a descriptive account of law.  But the 
“lawyer’s amoral ethical role” that Pepper defends conjoins a norm of 
fidelity to law to a positivist notion of law as strongly separate from 
morals. 
How does the Positivist separate law and morals?  This is an 
important consideration for the lawyer who asserts a duty not to disclose 
in the Mistake-of-Law case.  For in that case, the values that weigh in 
favor of disclosure seem at least as much legal as moral.  In the relevant 
jurisdiction, the value that a person has a right to recover from his injurer 
some measure of the costs of negligently inflicted injury has been enacted 
into law.  Those who urge disclosure do so because they feel that this law 
requires disclosure.  Without disclosure, the law is almost certain to go 
unvindicated. 
So why would Pepper and lawyers who take his view deny that the 
law requires disclosure?  They might be relying on some form of Legal 
Positivism. 
The first candidate would be the one Pepper and Luban mention – 
legal realism as defined by Holmes’s “bad man” perspective and earlier by 
John Austin.  This view identifies law with norms enforced by state-
imposed material sanctions.  In this perspective, we know that the 
negligence norm does not make disclosure in the “Mistake of Law” 
                                                 
25. A related difference concerned the “last lawyer in town” proviso.  Pepper would 
permit conscientious objection only where the client could get help elsewhere.  
Presumably, Luban would not recognize such a condition.  Under his view, it is desirable 
that the lawyer’s refusal precludes the client from pursuing her course of action. 
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scenario a legal duty because the state imposes no sanctions for non-
disclosure. 
 However, the “bad man” perspective is an unsatisfactory way of 
delimiting law.  It ignores a key feature of most people’s understanding of 
law: they associate law with obligation.  To call something law is to 
suggest that there is a presumptive reason to respect it independently of 
whatever sanctions the state imposes for violation.   
This brings us to the second candidate – the procedural perspective 
associated with H.L.A. Hart.  Hart says that legal systems separate law and 
non-law through secondary or institutional rules.  For example, Article I, 
sec. 7 of the U.S. Constitution says that when a bill vetoed by the 
President is approved by a two-thirds vote of the Senate and the House of 
Representatives it “shall become a law.”  A variety of secondary rules of 
this kind, both explicit and implicit, tell us when a norm counts as law.  
This view remains Positivist to the extent that it asserts that a norm’s 
character as law – and by implication its capacity to oblige compliance as 
law – depends on its institutional provenance rather than its intrinsic 
weight or acceptance. 
How does this view account for the intuition that there is no legal duty 
to disclose in the Mistake-of-Law scenario?  The comparative negligence 
statute surely meets the secondary tests that qualify a norm as law.  
However, that norm says nothing specifically about a lawyer’s duty to 
disclose.  The case for disclosure rests on a judgment that the basic norm 
can only be vindicated in these circumstances by lawyer disclosure.  If this 
judgment is correct, why should we not understand disclosure in this 
scenario as among the duties the statute creates?  And if the statute creates 
such a duty, why would we not consider it a legal duty? 
I suspect that part of the reluctance to recognize a professional duty to 
disclose arising from the comparative negligence principle or the general 
value of just adjudication rests on a further idea sometimes associated with 
the Positivist notion of legality.  For Austin, in addition to being enforced 
by sanction, law had to take the form of “command.”   Ronald Dworkin, in 
his critique of Positivism, suggested that a basic premise of the doctrine 
was that law takes the form of a “rule.”  A command or rule (in the 
technical sense elaborated by Dworkin) is a relatively explicit and 
categorical norm.  The scope of its application can be exhaustively 
specified, and it has a binary “all or nothing” quality.  Other types of 
norms – principles, policies, values – lack these qualities.  Their range 
cannot be fully specified in advance of their application, and they have 
persuasive rather than dispositive force.  They can weigh in favor of a 
conclusion without dictating the conclusion.  They provide reasons for 
doing or not doing something, but reasons that might be outweighed by 
competing reasons.   
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Dworkin made an extensive critique of the premise that law must take 
the form of command or “rule.”26  It is not clear that his argument has any 
real targets within legal philosophy.  H.L.A. Hart denied such a premise, 
and according to Jules Coleman “no legal positivist has ever actually held 
that all legal standards are rules.”27  However, many legal ethicists and 
practitioners seem at least tacitly committed to this proposition. 
In the Mistake-of-Law case, the norm that supports disclosure is not a 
command or “rule.”  It is an informal value or, in Dworkin’s terms, a 
principle.  This norm is implicit in the comparative negligence statute, and 
it gives a presumptive “all things considered” reason for disclosure rather 
than a categorical “all or nothing” reason for action.  The lawyer who 
refuses to consider that such a norm might create a legal duty may assume 
that such duties can only be created by norms that take the form of 
commands or Dworkinian rules. 
In fact, however, any conception of legality or the “bounds of the law” 
that excludes principles, policies, and informal values is unsatisfactory 
both as a descriptive account of the legal system and as a basis for an ethic 
for legal practitioners.  As a descriptive matter, this kind of Positivism 
misrepresents the way people understand legality.  As a normative matter, 
the ethic that results when this understanding of legality is joined with the 
professional duty of fidelity to law is unconvincingly narrow.  Reflective 
practitioners could not achieve self-respect or social respect on the basis of 
such an ethic. 
Dworkin and some of his predecessors argued these points by 
explicating judicial decisions like Riggs v. Palmer, in which what seems 
intuitively the correct result is best explained in terms of an informal norm 
such as, “no one should profit from his own wrongdoing.”28  (The plaintiff 
in that case was the beneficiary under a will, but he had murdered the 
testator.  The literal terms of the statute allowed the plaintiff to recover, 
but the court held that the statute was qualified by an implicit principle.) 
The lawyer’s role, of course, is different from the judge’s.  The 
judge’s decisions are typically dispositive; the lawyer’s are typically 
facilitative.  Nevertheless, the Dworkinian critique of the Positivist “model 
of rules” is relevant.   In locating the “bounds of the law” for the purpose 
of counseling their clients, lawyers instinctively rely on principles, 
policies, and informal norms.  No lawyer would hesitate to tell a client 
that, while the speed limit is sixty-five, police do not enforce until a driver 
exceeds seventy.  On the other hand, most would not consider telling a 
fugitive client that the police are focusing their search for the fugitive in 
neighborhood A and have stopped looking in neighborhood B.  Often in 
such cases, no relevant command or rule dictates such distinctions.  
                                                 
26.  RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-45 (1977). 
27.  JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 107 (2001). 
28. Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889). 
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Rather, the decision rests on the relative weights of background principles 
and policies. 
Some cases are controversial.  Should a labor lawyer tell a business 
manager that the penalties and process delays in connection with unfair 
labor practices are such that the economically rational course is probably 
to discharge union organizers in violation of the National Labor Relations 
Act?  People disagree.  But as Dworkin emphasizes, disagreement over the 
application of norms is not an indication that they are not law.  In the 
Mistake-of-Law hypothetical, the argument for disclosure may be 
mistaken in various ways.  Perhaps disclosure is inconsistent with the best 
interpretation of the comparative negligence statute.  The key point 
remains that determination of the bounds of the law requires us to consider 
the full range of relevant legal norms, and this includes norms that may 
not take the form of commands or “rules.” 
One could respond by acknowledging that there are informal values in 
these cases that potentially impose duties but insist that these values are 
moral rather than legal.  No doubt some cases are best described in this 
way.  Pepper and Luban discuss a case in which a father asks a lawyer to 
draw a will disinheriting his son because the father wishes to punish his 
son for protesting the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.  If there is a relevant 
principle that weighs strongly against the client’s freedom of disposition in 
this case, it is probably best described as a moral rather than a legal one.  
However, I do not think this is true of the Mistake-of-Law case.  No 
doubt the right to recover for negligently inflicted injury even when the 
subject is himself negligent does state a moral principle, but it is not an 
obviously correct or universally held one.  What is obviously correct is 
that comparative negligence is the applicable law.  Even if the lawyer is 
not committed to comparative negligence as a moral matter, she should 
have some duty to respect the legal principle that the legislature has 
enacted.  If such respect requires disclosure, then consequent duty seems a 
legal one. 
The Mistake-of-Law Problem requires consideration of a further issue.  
The fact that a legal value weighs in favor of disclosure, even a legal value 
capable of supporting a duty, does not necessarily mean that the duty 
applies to a lawyer opposing the party that disclosure would benefit.  If the 
“Problem of Legal Realism” is the tendency to ignore that anyone has a 
duty to respect the law, what we might call the “Problem of Legal 
Idealism” arises when we assume that everyone has the same legal duty to 
bring social life into conformity with enacted substantive law.  In fact, 
substantive law is mediated by a large body of secondary norms that 
allocate different duties to different actors.  Secondary norms sometimes 
allow or require people to act in ways that result in the non-enforcement of 
substantive law.  They may give officials authority to decide that law 
ought not be enforced (prosecutorial discretion, jury nullification).  Or 
they may create duties that inhibit or preclude enforcement of other duties 
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(for example, duties to respect privacy that block access to relevant 
evidence).  
However, enforcement norms seem to support disclosure in the 
Mistake-of-Law scenario.  It is a core principle of professional 
responsibility that lawyers are “officers of the court” or “officers of the 
legal system… having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”29 
This dimension of the lawyer’s role includes specific duties to nonclients 
codified in disciplinary rules, such as the duty to cite adverse legal 
authority to the court.  It is also usually understood to connote a residuum 
of uncodified duties in situations that the rules may not have anticipated or 
that may require more nuanced judgment than can be effectively 
articulated as disciplinary norms.   
For example, consider the duty of counsel in connection with client 
perjury as it was understood in some jurisdictions prior to the adoption of 
the current rules that explicitly require corrective disclosure to the court.  
Prior to the current rules, most jurisdictions had no specific norm requiring 
corrective disclosure, and they had confidentiality rules that on their face 
seemed to preclude it.  Nevertheless, authority tended to approve lawyer 
disclosure in this situation, sometimes invoking the “officer of the court” 
idea.30  
 Disclosure in the Mistake-of-Law scenario is a plausible elaboration 
of this residual responsibility.  It represents only a small extension of the 
codified disclosure duties (which already mandate disclosure to the court).  
It applies only in rare situations in which a conventional assumption about 
the operation of the adjudicatory process – that each side will discover the 
law favorable to it – breaks down with potentially severe consequences.  
And in such situations, the lawyer will often be the only role occupant 
who is capable of insuring that this basic condition of fair adjudication is 
met.  Moreover, disclosure does not jeopardize any important legal interest 
of the defendant.31 
                                                 
29. CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 17-19 (1986); MODEL RULES 
pmbl. (2009).  
30.  E.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 457 U.S. 157, 169-71 (1985); People v. DePallo, 754 
N.E.2d 751, 753 (2001). See also People v. Cox, 809 P.2d 351, 618 Cal. 3d 618, 654 
(1991) (holding, at a time when California’s confidentiality rule had no explicit 
exceptions, that lawyers have a duty to report information necessary to avert danger 
posed by a client to the court or its personnel). 
31. In their treatise, Geoffrey Hazard and William Hodes give two reasons for the 
Model Rule 3.3 requirement of disclosure of legal authority to the court: First, “there is a 
risk that [without disclosure] an erroneous decision (that could have been avoided) will 
result”; and second, “the law does not ‘belong’ to the client in the same way that factual 
information does.” GEOFFREY HAZARD & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 
29-11 (3d ed. Supp. 2007).  Of course, both reasons are fully applicable to our out-of-
court scenario.  Indeed, it is often argued that strong client loyalty only makes sense in 
court and that duties to nonclients should be stronger in out-of-court dealings.  See, e.g., 
Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers’ Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577  
(1975). 
 18
To say that the lawyer has a duty to disclose does not necessarily 
mean that she is subject to discipline for failing to do so.  The courts who  
approved of lawyers who disclosed client perjury under the prior regime 
did not suggest the lawyers would have been disciplined had they not 
disclosed.  Some professional duties may be enforced best through 
approval or criticism, rather than tangible sanctioning. 
Of course, it may often be difficult to identify the conditions in which 
such a principles-based duty applies.  The lawyer may not be able to 
confidently assess the effects of disclosure or whether these effects 
involve injustice. Or disclosure may exacerbate his own client’s 
vulnerability because of an independent defect in the process.  However, 
the Mistake-of-Law scenario stipulates that the lawyer is confident that 
these conditions are not present. It is not implausible that lawyers could 
make such determinations reliably. These determinations involve the same 
skills of legal and strategic assessment that they would have to have in 
order to advise their clients on the clients’ own interests even if the 
lawyers had no responsibility to third parties. We can concede that, in 
situations of uncertainty, there should be a presumption of client control, 
which will often mean nondisclosure.  But on the assumptions of the 
scenario, it seems consistent with conventional understandings about 
enforcement norms to impute such a duty to the lawyer.     
Note that the argument here is not that the officer-of-the-court role 
entails disclosure in the categorical sense that the conventionalist position 
asserts that the adversary system entails nondisclosure.  All the officer-of-
the-court role entails is a responsibility to take account of indications that 
injustice is likely to occur if the lawyer adheres to the presumption of 
partisanship.  The norms of informed decision-making and compensation 
for negligently-inflicted injury are Dworkinian principles. They don’t 
categorically dictate action; they designate concerns that must be weighed 
in a comprehensive decision. 
If accepted, the critique of Positivism precludes any strong distinction 
between law and morality, and thus, any strong distinction between legal 
ethics and ordinary morality.  However, it does not preclude weak 
distinctions.  Law draws heavily on ordinary morality, but it does not 
incorporate it wholesale.  It selects and emphasizes elements of ordinary 
morality.  The lawyer is trained in distinctive analytical techniques, and 
the proper application of these techniques is an element of good practice.  
The correct professional responsibility answer will converge with ordinary 
morality more often than Pepper allows, but it will not always do so – the 
Oppressive Testator may be a counter-example – and even where it does, 
the lawyer sometimes may have different, or additional reasons for the 
answer than the lay person. 
It is beneficial to recognize that many of the values in terms of which 
lawyering is criticized are legal as well as moral.  First, such recognition 
makes clear that the professional techniques and sources that lawyers draw 
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on in their professional work are available to structure and ground analysis 
of ethical problems.  Second, it implies that the decisions lawyers make 
are properly a subject of peer evaluation, criticism, and sometimes 
sanction within the profession.   
  
  
IV. THE INSTRUMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
Utilitarian perspectives seemed to have gained ground at the expense 
of fairness perspectives in academic legal discourse with the advent of the 
law-and-economics movement in the 1970s.32  This development 
paralleled or influenced a shift in the bar’s professional responsibility 
rhetoric.  The shift is visible in the transition from the ABA Model Code 
of 1970 and the ABA Model Rules of 1983.   
The “zealous advocacy within the bounds of the law” phrase that was 
so central to the Model Code does not appear in the Model Rules.  Instead, 
we find a heightened emphasis on confidentiality, both as independently 
important but also as part of the rationale for rules on conflicts of interests 
and the economic organization of practice.  This shift was related to an 
increasingly instrumental tone.  “Zealous advocacy” was portrayed as a 
good in itself.  But the rationale for confidentiality in the Model Rules is 
instrumental: it asserts that confidentiality is good because of its effects.  
The key effects are more disclosure to lawyers, better legal advice, and in 
turn, a higher level of compliance.33 Such arguments concede that client 
loyalty may be unjust in the case at hand but assert that some general 
practice of loyalty will have beneficial effects overall. 
The utilitarian perspective is not inherently biased in favor of client 
loyalty or, in the Mistake-of-Law case, non-disclosure.  In fact, some of 
the most notable academic analyses of legal ethics problems from a self-
consciously utilitarian perspective have been critical of aggressive 
advocacy norms, and especially the confidentiality rationale for them.34  
Nevertheless, in classroom discussions over many years, I have been 
struck by a strong tendency among students who favor nondisclosure to 
explain  their decision in instrumental terms.  
One might expect that the Mistake-of-Law problem would not lend 
itself easily to instrumental analysis.  The disclosure in question does not 
involve information provided by the client or in which the client has a 
                                                 
32.  See generally George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 
HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972); LOUIS KAPLOW AND STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS 
WELFARE (2006). 
33.  See MODEL RULES R. 1.6, cmt. 2 (2009). 
34.  See generally Daniel Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1988); Louis Kaplow and Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Present 
in Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability, 102 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1989); Fred 
Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989). 
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proprietary interest. Moreover, my version of the problem strains to 
eliminate long-term consequences.  The situation is idiosyncratic in some 
respects, and it is unlikely that the lawyer’s decision will become widely 
known.   
Nevertheless, my experience is that students viscerally reach for 
instrumental justifications for non-disclosure.  Many of them seem 
uncomfortable with non-instrumental perspectives, and I speculate that 
some have been taught elsewhere to think of the instrumental perspective 
as a hallmark of professional sophistication.35 They fight the hypothetical 
to conjure up contingencies that suggest the likelihood of various long-
term consequences.  Or they ignore that the problem calls for a specific 
response to a particular context and frame their answers in terms of some 
general and often rigid response to a broad range of situations.   
The most common instrumental arguments against disclosure that 
come up in discussions of the Mistake-of-Law Scenario are these: 
Uncertainty. Any argument for disclosure would depend on the 
particular circumstances of the situation, and a norm that turns on context 
will produce inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. 
Survival of the Fittest.  An ethic that encourages competent lawyers to 
bail out incompetent ones keeps incompetent ones in business longer than 
they otherwise would survive.  It interrupts the pattern of mistake-
discovery-complaint-sanction that purges incompetence from the bar.    
Laziness.  An ethical doctrine that gives lawyers reason to think they 
will be saved from serious errors by opposing lawyers encourages lawyers 
to under-prepare. 
Incapacity for complex judgment.  Lawyers’ duties to nonclients need 
to be regulated by bright-line rules that obviate complex judgment.  It is 
too much to expect lawyers to make grounded coherent all-things-
considered decisions in stressful and complex situations.  Even if we build 
in a presumption in favor of client interests where the matter is doubtful 
and even if we limit sanctions to criticism (perhaps even private criticism), 
it is unfair, oppressive, wasteful, futile, and/or counter-productive to ask 
the lawyer to confront such difficulties. 
Competitive disadvantage.  In the absence of an enforceable law 
mandating disclosure, the lawyer who voluntarily discloses will suffer 
unfair career disadvantage.  Clients will prefer the lawyers who defer most 
to their interests. 
                                                 
35. See generally Raymond Fisman, Shachar Kariv & Daniel Markovits, Exposure 
to Ideology and Distributional Preferences (unpublished manuscript, on file with The 
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics) (study of Yale law students indicating that students’ 
propensity to respond to survey problems in efficiency rather than fairness terms 
correlates with their first-year exposure to law-and-economics, as measured by the 
academic background and scholarly orientations of their instructors). 
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Engaging these arguments specifically risks losing perspective on the 
more general and basic objections to the instrumental perspective.  So I 
remit specific responses to a footnote,36 and focus on the general and basic 
objections. 
                                                 
36. Uncertainty: (1) Certainty is not a trump.  Uncertainty is a cost, but the cost has 
to be weighed against the benefits that would arise if, on average, a contextual norm 
produced better decisions.  (2) We should look, not only at uncertainty with respect to 
lawyer disclosure, but also uncertainty with respect to substantive law enforcement.  
Certainty with respect to disclosure may increase uncertainty with respect to 
enforcement, since a rule of nondisclosure increases the unpredictable influence of 
asymmetrical information on outcomes.  (3) The fact that it is easy to spin out hard cases 
for a contextual disclosure norm does not necessarily mean that a contextual norm would 
involve uncertainty.  Such a norm could be coupled with a presumption of client loyalty 
subject to an exception confined to clear cases (for example, where disclosure is clearly 
necessary to prevent injustice).  The question then would be, not whether there are hard 
cases in which lawyers tend to disagree, but whether lawyers tend to agree about when 
cases are hard and when they are clear.  The answer is not obvious, but in my experience, 
once lawyers assume that they have a duty to disclose in clear cases, they tend to agree 
that the Mistake-of-Law scenario is a clear case. 
Survival of the Fittest: (1) The plaintiff’s lawyer’s mistake is just as likely to be an 
isolated lapse as a symptom of deep incompetence.  If so, then it is much more socially 
efficient to correct it by disclosure.  (2) Given confidentiality norms, it is most often the 
case that only the client is in a position to discover mistakes, and since the client is a lay 
person, the client will often be unable to do so.   Where, as in this case, the mistake 
results in a lower settlement rather than an adverse judicial decision, discovery is 
especially unlikely.   
Laziness:  The argument seems to confuse sub-optimal preparation with a lowering 
of the optimal level of preparation.  A procedure that requires more sharing of 
information is likely to lower the optimal level of preparation.  Other things being equal, 
this is good for clients.   
Incapacity for complex judgment:    In other contexts – for example, when 
explaining why lay people shouldn’t be allowed to give legal advice or why seven years 
of higher education should be required for admission to the bar – lawyers point to a 
capacity for complex judgment as the hallmark of their expertise.  The principal norms 
that govern the lawyer’s duties to clients – the duties of care and loyalty – are contextual 
and presuppose complex judgment.  Moreover, judges and public officials make complex 
judgments, and lawyers would not be able to anticipate or influence their decisions if they 
were unable to follow and replicate their reasoning. 
Competitive disadvantage.  (1) The argument seems irrelevant to the scenario, since 
there is no reason to think that the lawyer’s decision in this particular case will become 
known generally or known even to the present client.  (2) To the extent that the scenario 
describes a frequently occurring situation, the competitive disadvantage consideration 
would be a good argument for a rule mandating disclosure.  To the extent that it occurs 
infrequently and in many variations, it may make more sense to subsume it under a 
general residual duty of fairness (arguably, this is what existing doctrine does).  In this 
latter case, it is not clear that clients, at the time they choose counsel, attach great 
importance to what lawyers do in idiosyncratic situations or that they would acquire 
enough information about what they do to take account of it.  (3) The argument assumes 
that lawyers compete for clients on the basis of how aggressively they are willing to 
advance their interests.  This is only partly true.  Lawyers can present themselves as 
champions, but they can also market themselves as reputational intermediaries.   A 
reputational intermediary benefits a client not by asserting his interests aggressively, but 
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First, it seems most likely that the lawyer’s decision will have no 
consequences beyond the immediate case.  The decision is unlikely to 
become generally known, and the case is in many respects idiosyncratic. 
One might object that the idiosyncratic nature of the situation deprives 
it of general interest.  However, I think the scenario is representative of an 
interesting and broad category – the category of cases that are not 
governed by rules and where the relevant ethical considerations appear 
intrinsic and immediate rather than indirect and long-term.   
Second, even if we assume that this lawyer’s disclosure would 
become known and would influence future conduct or even if we shift 
perspective to that of a regulator designing a rule for a class of similar 
situations, instrumental analysis would be inconclusive and probably 
unhelpful.  Instrumental analysis depends on predictions about the net 
aggregate effects of general patterns of conduct that are, to say the least, 
debatable. It’s not enough to justify a rule against disclosure that 
disclosure is likely to have bad effects of the type the arguments predict.  
These bad effects would have to outweigh the good effects that are also 
likely to follow from disclosure.  To determine which effects predominate 
would require extensive observation and collection of data in experimental 
and natural situations involving different norms and practices.  In fact, no 
one has done any extensive observation or data collection on these issues, 
and it seems unlikely that any one with the capacity to do it has any 
intention of doing it.   
Third, the instrumental arguments for nondisclosure in the Mistake-of-
Law Problem imply an image of lawyers that is, in important respects, 
unattractive.  It is hardly flattering to emphasize that lawyers have a 
propensity to incompetence, laziness, and mental flat-footedness.  On the 
other hand, there is some truth in these assertions.  The bar often claims 
that lawyers have exceptional judgment and virtue, but these claims are 
usually offered in support of exclusionary entry requirements or lax 
regulation, and as such should prompt skepticism.  Perhaps we should 
welcome the candor of the concessions in the disclosure duty context.  
The more fundamental problem is the way the instrumental arguments 
attenuate the relation between the lawyer’s conduct and the values that 
give dignity and worth to her role.   A basic criticism of utilitarianism is 
that it focuses on effects to the exclusion of the moral qualities of agency.  
If, to take a famous example, Jim could save twenty lives by shooting an 
innocent person, he should do so according to at least some versions of 
utilitarianism.  Even those who concede that this might be the right answer 
object to a moral view that fails to appreciate the cost to Jim in shooting 
the innocent person.  To be forced to act in a way that he considers 
intrinsically immoral, even if redeemed by more remote consequences, is 
                                                                                                                         
by inducing others to trust him.  The lawyer cannot play this role without credibly 
committing herself to the third parties not to pursue the client’s interests 
opportunistically.   
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oppressive and degrading.  We would not want even a plausible belief that 
the killing is the right thing to do to make Jim indifferent or insensitive to 
the local injustice and cruelty of his act.37   
Jim’s situation is portrayed as horrible, but its relatively extreme 
circumstances encourage us to think of it as a once-in-a-lifetime burden.  
By contrast, the instrumentalist approach to legal ethics seems to consign 
lawyers to a lifetime of such burdens.  The distinctive ethical feature of the 
lawyer’s role would be the obligation to repeatedly subvert the vindication 
of law in particular circumstances in the interests of some more remote 
vindication.  From a morally ambitious perspective, the role seems to 
involve a daily mutilation of Promethean proportions without the 
compensating satisfaction of visible Promethean achievement.  From a 
mundane point of view, it seems a kind of “get out of jail free card” that 
permits the lawyer to rationalize irresponsible actions by self-serving and 
unverifiable appeals to future effects. 
Legal ethics does not need to wrestle with the claims of utilitarianism 
and the agency critiques of it until there is substantial reason to believe 
that the controversial practices of aggressive advocacy do produce net 
long-term benefits.  In fact, in most cases, the only effects that we can 
confidently anticipate are the immediate ones.  Thus, the only responsible 
bases for ethical appraisal are the intrinsic qualities of the relevant actions 
and their immediate effects.     
 
IV. CONCLUSION: THE INTERRUPTED TRADITION 
  
All three of the perspectives we’ve considered represent departures 
from the dominant twentieth century tradition in professional 
responsibility.  This tradition began with Progressive era and remained 
strong through the New Deal and much of the postwar eras.  Dworkin’s 
jurisprudence is in many ways a continuation of it.  Although the tradition 
was developed most often with respect to judging, some of its most 
influential exponents, including Louis Brandeis and Henry Hart (a 
                                                 
37.  BERNARD WILLIAMS, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in UTILIARIANISM: FOR AND 
AGAINST 77-150 (J. J. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973).  Note that although I have 
frequently characterized one of the courses of action in the Mistake-of-Law story as 
“nondisclosure”, it does involve agency.  The nondisclosure option is not simple 
passivity, but the active negotiation of an unjust settlement. 
Markovits develops the critique of instrumentalism powerfully. See MARKOVITS, 
supra note 9, at 103-51.  However, he seems insensitive to the difficulties posed for an 
ambitious conception of personal virtue by an ethic that requires the lawyer in some 
situations to actively subvert what she plausibly believes to be the most weighty moral 
stakes (both substantive and procedural).  My own “first-person” assessment of legal 
ethics argues that conventional ethics is incompatible with the idea of “meaningful work” 
that inspired the modern professional project and replicates the core problem of 
“alienation” that classical social theory ascribed to amoral capitalism. WILLIAM H. 
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 109-37 (1998). 
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Brandeis clerk) developed its implications for lawyering.  This perspective 
has been called Purposivism.  Its most basic premise is that legal rules and 
institutions should be elaborated and applied to effectuate their purposes.38   
The relevant rules and institutions are procedural as well as 
substantive, and they take full account of social conflict and value 
pluralism.  A key function of legal institutions is to resolve conflict and 
make possible cooperation among people with different goals and values.  
So Purposivism presupposes, not communitarian harmony, but rather an 
overlapping consensus on fair ground rules of mutual respect and 
accommodation.   
The lawyer ethic implied by Purposivism strives to directly connect 
the lawyer’s service to individual clients to the values that underlie 
applicable legal norms.  It prescribes creativity in the search for mutually 
advantageous structures of cooperation and a forswearing of opportunism, 
short-term advantage-taking, and guileful manipulation.  In the Purposivist 
view, law defines a realm of private autonomy, but its limits must be 
ascertained purposively. 
The development of Purposivism paralleled and contributed to the 
emergence of the modern ideal of professionalism.  Brandeis was a major 
theoretician of both the general theory of professionalism and its legal 
instantiation.  The idea of professionalism proposed a conception of work 
that united self-assertion with social commitment and service to private 
interest with respect for public norms.  It sought to create roles and 
institutions that differed from the antinomian market on the one hand and 
the rule-bound bureaucracy on the other.  By proposing a style of legal 
analysis that connected private ends and public purposes directly, the 
Purposivists showed how the general aspirations of professionalism could 
be vindicated in the legal field. 
To a surprising extent, recent academic theorizing about professional 
responsibility fails to engage this tradition and often ignores it completely.  
Markovits takes a brief look the early 19th century Republican vision and 
concludes that it is not a model for contemporary lawyers.  He then by-
                                                 
38. I develop the implications of Purposivism for legal ethics in chapters 5 and 6 of 
THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE, supra note 34, at 109-69.  An earlier version of chapter 5 
appears as Ethics, Professionalism, and Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 445 
(1997).   
Other accounts that deny a strong distinction between legal and ordinary morality 
include ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1995); Russell Pearce, Lawyers as 
America’s Governing Class: The Formation and Dissolution of the Original 
Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381 
(2001); Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer: A Brief Informal History of a Myth with 
Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1169 (2009); and Bradley Wendel, 
Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1169 (2005). See also Fred 
Zacharias, Integrity Ethics, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 541 (2009) (emphasizing the extent 
professional ethical doctrine incorporates ordinary morality).  There is substantial overlap 
between these arguments and mine. 
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passes the entire modern history of professionalism prior to the ABA’s 
1970 Code.  Pepper looks beyond the libertarian doctrine he prefers only 
to take resigned account of “the Problem of Legal Realism.”  He takes no 
note of the solution to the problem of legal realism proposed by 
Purposivism: if legal norms can be elaborated in terms of intelligible 
social purposes, those purposes can serve as grounding for both judicial 
decision and lawyer conduct.  And of course, the instrumentalists take no 
account of history at all. 
These recent theorists portray legal ethics as at least superficially 
bizarre and in need of strenuous rationalization.  This view is foreign to 
the moral vision that most influenced the founders of modern American 
professionalism.  They saw professional role, not as a problem, but as an 
opportunity, an opportunity to escape from the provincialism and 
stultification of the narrowly commercial life and to connect with larger 
networks and purposes.  They saw the distinctive character of professional 
(as opposed especially, to bureaucratic) work as the adaptive vindication 
of general social norms in particular circumstances.39  Purposivist 
jurisprudence perfectly complements this vision. 
The Purposivist analysis of the Mistake-of-Law problem would 
resolve ambiguity about the relevant rules and the lawyer’s role by asking 
what lawyer conduct would best vindicate the relevant substantive norms 
and would best promote fair adjudication of the dispute.  Such an analysis 
would resemble what I described at the beginning as the perspective of 
ordinary morality.  The Purposivists thought law added to ordinary 
morality a complex structure of institutions and authority that facilitated 
the resolution of complex problems for which ordinary morality alone 
provided insufficient resources.  But they emphasized that law was 
importantly grounded in ordinary morality, and they cultivated a lawyer 
role that emphasized the lawyer’s connection to, rather than separation 
from, ordinary morality.  Their view deserves more consideration than 
much recent academic professional responsibility discourse has given it. 
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